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Abstract 
By asking the question “in what areas of 29 CFR 1960 are Federal Agency 
Program leaders deficient with regard to committing to their OSH programs;” this 
research project explored the commitment issue(s) Federal Agency Leaders 
encounter while administering their OSH programs. Since the inception of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and their revelation that 
management commitment is critical to OSH program success, senior leadership 
has struggled exercising this concept. Many safety professionals, such as those 
cited in the Literature Review of this study have also examined this issue. 
However, while many articles and peer-reviewed journals indicate there is a 
definite nexus between management commitment and OSH program 
effectiveness, none seem to identify those regulatory components senior leaders 
neglect or find challenging. 
A twenty-three question survey was created and issued to leaders from 
two respective federal agencies. Questions focused on OSHA guidance 
regarding elements of a successful OSH program as prescribed by 29 CFR 
1960. To aid in answering the research question, common themes were 
identified as areas that leaders barely focused on or blatantly ignored. Upon 
scrutinizing the data, there were several indications as to what the underlying 
causal factors are. Based on this data recommendations for corrective action 
were offered. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Background 
Prior to the twentieth century there is little information pertaining to the 
safety and health of American workplaces. During this era, workers encountered 
various types of occupational hazards ranging from animals and hand tools, to 
ladders and stairs. With the onset of the Industrial Revolution these same 
workers substituted steam engines for animals, machines for hand tools, and 
elevators for ladders (Aldrich, 2001). 
Although work conditions improved, employers still showed little concern 
for the wellbeing of their employees. If an employee suffered a work-related 
injury, their only recourse was to sue their employer for negligence while taking 
unpaid, but necessary time away from work. In the event of a fatality the onus for 
litigation rested with the employees heirs. Unfortunately, if the employer was able 
to prove the employee accepted job-related risk, was injured by the actions of 
another employee, or was generally negligent; the law suit was usually 
dismissed. To that end, the majority of injured employees never received 
compensation and those who did were awarded approximately half of their 
annual salary. Amongst many employers and managers alike, employee safety 
and health was inherently foreign terminology until the passage of Workers 
Compensation Laws in 1908. 
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Workers Compensation systems are fundamentally a no-fault mechanism 
through which employees who incur work-related injuries and illnesses are 
compensated with monetary and medical benefits (Schneid, 2000). The system 
of Workers Compensation serves as a monetary inducement for employers to 
prevent injuries and illnesses amid their employees. The logic behind the system 
and the reason why employers embraced it is because they realized employee 
medical costs and lost wages resultant of placing employees in injurious work 
environments can easily exceed the costs associated with establishing safe and 
healthful working conditions. While the implementation of Workers Compensation 
Laws drove incident rates down and provided employers direction toward 
employee safety, it did not motivate them to truly commit to employee safety and 
health. Ultimately, employers were still inspired by such things as production 
cost, deadlines, employee turnover rates, throughput, etc. Thus, rendering 
employee safety and health inconsequential. In light of the uncertainty of the 
safety and health of the American workforce, the United States Congress took 
action. 
In 1970 the United States Congress enacted United States Code Title 29 
Chapter 15, Occupational Safety and Health; with President Richard Nixon’s 
support and signature the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 was 
passed. The purpose of the Act was to assure the safe and healthful working 
conditions for working men and women through three targeted efforts: by 
authorizing enforcement of the standards developed under the Act, by assisting 
and encouraging the states in their efforts to assure safe and healthful working 
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conditions, and by providing for research, information, education, and training in 
the field of occupational safety and health (Nixon, 1970). In addition to the 34 
sections contained in the Act, Section 5(a)(1) and (2) discusses the lawful duties 
imposed on employers. In accordance with the aforementioned section, each 
employer shall comply with the Act and ensure they provide their employees a 
safe and healthful work environment which is free from recognized hazards that 
may cause harm or death. With this new legislation in place, employers were 
motivated to pay more attention to their employees safety and health and the 
environment in which they worked. However, the Act failed to commission an 
entity that would be charged with ensuring provisions of the Act were being 
carried out. 
 In 1971 the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) was 
formed and sanctioned to serve as the regulatory arm of the OSH Act of 1970. 
Since its creation, employee fatality and injury rates have drastically decreased. 
Though prior to 1970, statistics on work-related injuries, illnesses, fatalities, and 
workplace conditions were not well-maintained; it is estimated that approximately 
14,000 workers were killed on the job (OSHA, 2013). Since that time, there has 
been a decrease of approximately 4,300 work-related fatalities while the 
workforce has nearly doubled. Subsequent of the OSH Act, the rate of reported 
serious workplace injuries and illnesses has declined from 11 per 100 workers in 
1972 to 3.6 per 100 workers in 2009 (OSHA, 2013). 
 With the powers vested in them by Congress, OSHA successfully 
improved safety and health for employees in the workplace. Amongst their 
 
4 
various methods to obtaining compliance from employers, they have the ability to 
levy monetary penalties for standards violation. Although effective in the private 
sector, this ability does not extend to federal agencies. Therefore, the success 
OSHA has had in the private sector with getting employers to comply with 
standards, abate identified hazards, and commit to the safety and health of their 
employees is most often non-existent in federal government. For that reason, 
federal agency senior leaders have no disincentive for choosing not to commit to 
the safety and health of their workforce. In an attempt to address this concern 
specifically, on February 26, 1980 President Jimmy Carter signed Executive 
Order (E.O.) 12196, Occupational Safety and Health Programs for Federal 
Employees. 
E.O. 12196 serves as a more prescriptive extension of the OSH Act 
specifically for federal agencies and imposes additional responsibilities on 
agency leaders. In addition to re-iterating Section 5 of the OSH Act, E.O. 12196 
provides direction for Occupational Safety and Health Committees, the 
Department of Labor, the Federal Advisory Council on Occupational Safety and 
Health, and the General Services Administration. In order to enforce this E.O., 29 
CFR Part 1960, Basic Program Elements for Federal Employees was 
promulgated by OSHA on October 21, 1980. 
The primary purpose of 29 CFR 1960 is to enforce the basic program 
elements established by the OSH Act and expounded upon by E.O. 12196. 
Although agency leaders are required to operate a program in accordance with 
the basic program elements, those elements contain numerous provisions which, 
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by their terms, permit agency leaders the flexibility necessary to implement their 
programs in a manner consistent with their respective mission, size, and 
organizational structure (OSHA, 1980). It can reasonably be inferred that 
perhaps penalties are not levied on federal agencies because OSHA recognizes 
the uniqueness each agency possess, which in turn may prevent them from 
obtaining full compliance. Consequently, although logical, OSHA inherently 
debunked their primary method of obtaining compliance from these employers 
and instead, unofficially, made regulatory standards negotiable. Thereby, giving 
Federal Agency Program (FAP) leaders the latitude to determine their level of 
commitment to the safety and health of their employees. 
Applicable to private industry and FAPs, OSHA has promulgated 
countless standards, guidance documents, and tools to ensure employers have 
the necessary resources they need to provide their employees a safe and 
healthful work environment. However, OSHA has yet to develop regulatory 
requirements governing management commitment and tenets therein. In 1982, 
OSHA enacted the Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) which promotes effective 
worksite-based safety and health. Within VPP, management, labor, and OSHA 
established cooperative relationships at workplaces that have implemented 
comprehensive safety and health management systems. Approval into VPP is 
OSHA’s official recognition of the outstanding efforts of employers and 
employees who have achieved exemplary occupational safety and health 
programs (OSHA, 2013). The motivation for employers, private sector and 
Federal Agency Programs, to aspire to achieve VPP “Star Status” was the 
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understanding that OSHA would inspect their programs and facilities less often; 
or approximately every 60 months. In light of this initiative and associated 
incentive, VPP curbed some of the management commitment issues, but was not 
a complete solution. In 1988, OSHA solicited best practices from employers 
around the nation with focus on safety and health program management. 
Information received led to the 1989 “Safety and Health Program Management 
Guidelines; Issuance of Voluntary Guidelines” federal register document to be 
used by employers to prevent occupational injuries and illnesses. The language 
in the guidelines is general so that it may be broadly applied in general industry, 
shipyards, marine terminals, and long-shoring activities regardless of the size, 
nature, or complexity of operations. The guidelines consist of program elements 
which represent a distillation of applied safety and health management practices 
that are used by employers who are successful in protecting the safety and 
health of their employees (Foster, 1989). This guidance document provided 
definite direction for correcting management commitment issues, but did not 
solve the problem. 
 In 2009, in effort to curb the negative trend FAPs were experiencing and 
to shed light on the importance of OSH within the federal government; OSHA 
announced its new inspection targeting program i.e. “FEDTARG.” The charter for 
this program directed the inspection of FAPs in an organized and targeted 
manner. More specifically, those agencies experiencing a high number of lost 
time injury cases, as reported by the federal Office of Workers Compensation 
Programs (OWCP) would be program participants. Since FEDTARG is a very 
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specific program, the associated governing directive provides explicit direction to 
OSHA Compliance Health and Safety Officers (CHSO) with respect to how the 
inspections will occur , frequency, etc (Barab, 2009). 
 The issue with FEDTARG is twofold. The program is based unilaterally on 
Workers Compensation data and although the inspections are slightly more 
rigorous than typical no-notice inspections, they are handled the same with 
respect to violations. When a Notice of Violation (NOV) is issued, OSHA expects 
the agency to implement corrective action, but lacks the necessary motivator to 
ensure things get accomplished in a judicious and “timely” manner. Moreover, 
the program premise intertwined Workers Compensation programs with safety 
programs. 
 There is definitely an interdependency between the two programs, but 
they are not necessarily reliant on each other and may function independently. 
For example, not every OSHA-recordable incident is compensable and not every 
OWCP claim is OSHA-recordable. To that end FAP leaders, once aware of the 
FEDTARG participation criteria, began focusing on OWCP versus safety 
programs. OWCP directly relates to agency expenditure whereas many safety 
incident and hazards garner residual cost or none at all. Unfortunately, institution 
of the FEDTARG program failed to realize its purpose; drive down lost time 
cases by conducting targeted, comprehensive “safety” inspections. Lost time 
cases did decrease, but safety programs remained virtually unchanged.  
Commitment to safety should be articulated at the highest levels of an 
organization and to be effective, must be translated into shared values, beliefs, 
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and behavioral norms throughout those levels. An effective occupational safety 
and health program requires a positive safety culture based on mutual trust 
between management and employees, and a desire to actively look after one’s 
own safety and the safety of others. Although this concept seems practical, 
Federal Agency Program leaders and managers struggle to realize this 
foundational principle. 
 
Statement of The Problem 
Full management commitment, as defined and prescribed by OSHA, is 
lacking among Federal Agencies. For more than four decades, since the creation 
of OSHA, Safety Professionals have noted a resounding parallel between the 
application of thorough management practices in OSH programs and a low 
incidence of work-related injuries and illnesses. History has revealed where 
effective management commitment is prevalent in OSH programs, injury and 
illness rates are considerably lower than rates at similar worksites where 
management commitment is weak or non-existent. Thus, identifying the barriers 
Federal Agency Program leaders and managers encounter when negotiating the 
commitment component of their OSH programs is imperative to bolstering safety 
programs across all federal agencies. 
 
Purpose of The Study 
 The purpose of this study is to identify areas of Federal Agency OSH 
programs which are ignored by Federal Agency Leaders and ultimately inhibits 
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them from fully committing to their OSH programs. Factors of Federal Agency 
OSH programs that OSHA deems necessary such as: as accountability, 
management visibility and involvement, program understanding, and resource 
allocation will be reviewed to determine where weakness exist. 
Recommendations for improvement will be offered to refute the dissention 
Federal Agency Program leaders have toward full OSH program commitment. 
 
Potential Significance 
 This study was noteworthy in that it explored a prevalent issue that 
plagues all Federal Agencies. By conducting this study, it also serves as the 
foundation for future studies or scholarly research. Moreover, identifying the 
linchpins to this issue and providing specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, 
and timely (S.M.A.R.T) soloutions for improvement could be invaluable to 
Federal Agency Program leaders and their employees. 
 
Definition of Terms 
 Federal Agency: an Executive Department or any employing unit, or 
authority of the Executive Branch of the Government (OSHA, 2013).  
 Management Commitment: senior leaders, managers, and supervisors 
actively participating in the organizational Occupational Safety and Health 
program by committing resources, making and enforcing policy, and being 
“visible” champions of safety in the workplace. 
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 Safety Climate: An organizational factor that refers to the workers shared 
perceptions of the organizations policies, procedures, and practices as they 
relate to the value and importance of safety within the organization (Zohar, 1980) 
 Safety Culture: A set of values, perceptions, attitudes, and patterns of 
behavior with regard to safety shared by members of the organization; as well as 
a set of policies, practices, and procedures relating to the reduction of employees 
exposure to occupational risks, implemented at every level of the organization, 
and reflecting a high level of concern and commitment to the prevention of 
accidents and illnesses (Fernandez-Muniz, Montes-Peon, & Vasquez-Ordas, 
2007) 
 Safety Management System: An integrated mechanism in an organization 
designed to control the risk that can affect workers health and safety, and at the 
same time ensures the organization can easily comply with relevant legislation 
(Fernandez-Muniz, Montes-Peon, & Vasquez-Ordas, 2009). 
 Senior Leadership: the top-level managers or executives of an 
organization responsible for providing vision, policy, and direction to its 
workforce. Establishes organizational goals and associated metrics used to 
indicate the progress toward achieving the vision. Responsible for the 
Occupational Safety and Health program, workplace conditions, and employee 
safety and health. 
 S.M.A.R.T.: A mnemonic used to help set objectives to achieve goals and 
make recommendations to control hazards when managing risk in employee 
workplaces. Corrective actions and (or) abatement strategies should be: Specific 
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(concrete, detailed, well defined), Measurable (numbers, quantity, comparison), 
Achievable (feasible, actionable), Realistic (consider resources), and Timely 
(defined timeline). 
 
Assumptions 
 It was assumed survey respondents answered the questions candidly, 
without bias, or fear of reprisal based on assurance and guidance provided by 
the researcher. In effort to instigate participation, respondents were advised that 
their personal information would not be collected or included in the study. 
Respondents were also assured that their supervision would neither have 
oversight or involvement in the study. 
 Conclusions, recommendations, and other associated information derived 
from the survey were exclusively representative of the sample group. 
 
Limitations 
 The sample group was comprised of 20 respondents from two different 
federal agencies. Participation was not mandatory and therefore only 44 percent 
(7/16) responded from one agency and 68 percent (13/19) responded from the 
other. 
 In addition to providing instructions on how to complete the survey, 
respondents were asked not to delegate completing the survey to their 
subordinates. Due to the anonymity of the survey, it is unknown as to whether it 
was completed by the intended person or someone else. However, as an 
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disincentive for the intended sample group to not follow instructions, the 
researcher gained the support of the sample groups supervising officials. A 
message from those individuals was sent ahead of the survey reiterating, to the 
intended audience, the importance of their candid feedback and singular 
participation. 
 
Organization of the Study 
 This research project is organized into five primary chapters: introduction, 
literature review, methodology, research findings and analysis, and discussions 
and implications. 
 Using a 5-point Likert Scale (5=strongly agree, 4=agree, 3=neutral, 
2=disagree, 1=strongly disagree), data was collected from senior leaders within 
two Federal Agencies.   
 Survey questions were strictly based off 29 CFR 1960, Basic Program 
Elements for Federal Employees. Surveys were administered to senior leaders 
via Microsoft Outlook email which had an embed hyperlink that enabled access 
to the internet-based survey portal. Within the email and again in the survey 
instructions, the researcher expressed that their responses will be completely 
confidential, that no one from their organization will see their responses, their 
superiors will not see their responses, and their completed survey would be 
deleted upon data extrapolation. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
Literature Review Presented In No Particular Order Of Relevance 
 Abudayyeh, Fredericks, Butt, and Shaar (2006) studied the correlation 
between management commitment to safety and the frequency of construction-
related injuries and illnesses. A significant part of the study was performing an 
thorough literature review as well as an analysis of injury and illness data 
gathered from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The BLS analysis confirmed 
that the construction industry accounted for 20 percent of workplace fatalities and 
8.8 percent of occupational injuries and illnesses across all industries. The top 
500 construction companies in the U.S. were targeted for the study. The survey 
crafted for the study was divided into two parts: 1) company profile and 2) safety 
information. Safety-related questions pertained to safety budget, communication 
skills, safety culture, empowerment, continuing monitoring and improvement, and 
involvement. Respondents were contacted by mail and telephone and of the 410 
surveys mailed, 12.5 percent were returned. After examining the data, results 
indicated there is a direct correlation between management commitment and 
employee incident experience. In addition, the study revealed that 48 percent of 
the respondents rated safety as the companies number one priority. However, 
data also suggests that as incident rates decreased the priority of safety 
decreased as well; and vice versa. Finally, the study revealed that those 
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companies with some type of safety management system in place to compliment 
OSHA regulation yielded lower incident rates and a better overall safety record. 
 Bhattacharya & Tang (2013) researched the effectiveness of the 
managers role as it relates to OSH in the British shipping industry. OSH in the 
shipping industry has been in distress for some time. Research of years past 
indicate the rate of fatalities were between13 and 28 times higher than that of the 
general British workforce. It was identified that a causal factor was poor 
regulatory standards and the fact that senior leadership was typically on-shore 
while the bulk of the workforce was off-shore. Thus, they restructured themselves 
stepping away from traditional regulation (being inspected by a third party and 
correcting issues) and implemented an International Safety Management (ISM) 
system, which allowed them to virtually self-regulate. However, although the ISM 
directed ship managers to assume more responsibility for managing OSH 
programs (and they did), this new way of doing business had very little overall 
impact. In effort to determine the shortfall of the new system, Bhattacharya & 
Tang conducted a study of two shipping companies using employee surveys and 
workplace observations. Of the two companies, one operated globally and the 
other maintained a European base. It was found that the problem resided in the 
organizational structure (for both companies). Historically, there is a great 
dichotomy between the workforce, management, and senior leadership. Off-
shore there are four supervisor/managers, while the rest of the workforce is 
made up of seafarers (front-line employees). With this hierarchal divide and due 
to employees fear of losing their jobs, there is no chatter about safety issues. 
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Employees perceive that if they raise concerns about OSH, then that may be 
construed as complaining, which could lead to expulsion. Unfortunately, although 
ship management conducts periodic OSH meetings and invite employees to 
participate and voice concerns; employees choose not to speak. Moreover, 
managers seem to have adopted a dictatorship style of leadership, which to their 
ignorance, is counterproductive to fostering OSH participation amongst 
employees. Based on these findings, it was concluded that if management would 
change their leadership style to be more democratic, that would positively affect 
change amongst the workforce; which in turn impacts the OSH program. 
 This study is important to the research project because it identified that the 
programmatic disconnect was not management commitment per se, but with 
where and how management chose to focus their efforts. In this case 
management followed direction by taking control of the OSH program, but along 
the way failed to realize the importance of active employee involvement, which is 
more than meeting attendance. 
 Bragg (2002) explored the four core tenets of employee and management 
commitment and the synergy that must be present to yield OSH program 
success. Commitment tenets for employees and management respectively 
include 1) want to, 2) have to, 3) ought to, and 4) uncommitted. Bragg suggest 
that the best employees are those who “want to” work for their employer, while 
those employees who fall into categories 2-4 are less desirable. Category 2-4 
employees are said to be problematic, not focused, and less productive. 
Similarly, management who “want to” be committed to their employees and 
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organization do what is necessary to create and sustain attractive work 
environments. Committed employers desire to be known as the “best place to 
work.” Category 2-4 managers are committed to their employees only because 
they have to show some signs of commitment to attract a workforce. These 
employers merely satisfy legal requirements of occupational safety and health 
and do what is necessary to stay competitive. Bragg concluded that although 
many factors affect employers commitment to their employees, three contributors 
stand out as primary drivers: fairness, trust, and care and concern for employees. 
 This article is important because it explored the converse side of 
management commitment by categorically placing employees and employers 
accordingly. By doing this it enables one to identify motivators, which in turn can 
help shape action. As such, it reveals that although management may be 
genuinely committing themselves to their OSH programs and employees; 
misperception, inconsistency, and insincerity will undermine their efforts. Thus, it 
is equally important for management to not only look inwardly for improvement, 
but outwardly at the workforce as well. This sort of holistic examination may lead 
to a more synergistic relationship between management and the workforce. 
 Du Pont Safety (1989) researched how “Improved Safety Could Save 
Billions.” Exactly 676 companies from around the world were included in the 
study representing such industries as mining, power generation, construction, 
food processing, textiles, pulp and paper, chemicals, refining, paint, rubber, steel, 
printing, electronics, automotive, trucking, and general manufacturing. The 
premise of this study was basic in that Du Pont collected lost workday case 
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(LWC) data from participating companies and determined that each company 
could save an average of $3.1 million over a five-year period by improving worker 
safety, while potential total savings could reach $2.1 billion. The $2.1 billion 
figure is based on the 35,100 LWC reported each year by companies included in 
the study. Total annual cost for these LWCs was $677 million, using the National 
Safety Council's estimated cost of more than $19,300 per LWC. As comparison, 
for drawing their conclusion, Du Pont also examined companies with lower LWC 
rates. Du Pont found that “the key to success is management commitment and if 
safety is seen as important as production and product quality, then an 86% 
improvement in LWC rates is a realistic goal. Additionally, Du Pont adds that at a 
5% profit margin, the savings could mean as much as $42 billion in sales, making 
safety a very profitable consideration. 
 Although rudimentary at its core, this study is important because it 
effectively depicted LWC as dollars; this is not a new idea. However, by Du Pont 
researching various industries in the U.S. and abroad magnifies the necessary 
relationship between “sound” management commitment and organizational 
success. 
 Fernandez-Muniz, Montes-Peon, & Vasquez-Ordas (2007) analyzed 
“safety culture” within the organizational construct. To include an exhaustive 
examination of topical peer reviewed study’s and articles; this study surveyed 
455 organizations with a goal of developing a model for positive safety culture 
and identifying its tenets. During the literature review it was discovered that there 
is not a universally agreed upon model of what positive safety culture is or what 
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its primary components are. It was also found that many of the past study’s 
based their findings primarily on the employees perspective. By using information 
gathered during the literature review, the authors developed questions to be used 
in the survey. The survey was administered to senior leadership, managers, 
supervisors, and employees; all selectees were randomly chosen to participate. 
Survey topics included safety policy, incentives, training, communication, 
planning, control, managers commitment, employees commitment, and safety 
performance. The study concluded that positive safety culture has three main 
components: 1) management commitment, 2) employee involvement, and 3) a 
safety management system. In addition, they found that managers play an 
essential role in reducing hazards since they have dual influence on employee 
attitudes and behaviors, which are indicative of the safety management system. 
 Fernandez-Muniz, Montes-Peon, & Vasquez-Ordas (2009) looked into the 
relationship between occupational safety management and organizational 
performance. To ensure they gained a pulse of what has been researched 
versus what had not; the researchers conducted an extensive literature review.  
Expectedly, they found that other researchers before them had studied various 
aspects of management commitment and safety, but none had focused on the 
holistic effect safety management has on an organization. Recognizing that 
Spanish organizations severely lacked safety culture, the researchers focused 
their study accordingly. They hypothesized the following: 1) the safety 
management system has a positive influence on safety, 2) the safety 
management system has a positive influence on competitive performance, and 3) 
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the safety management system has a positive influence on economic-financial 
performance. Using notions gleaned from the literature review they constructed a 
survey to be issued to 455 Spanish organizations. Survey content was based on:  
safety policy, employee incentive, training, communication, planning, and 
controlling activities. The study concluded that there is direct causation between 
safety management and organizational performance. More specifically, in 
response to their hypothesis, they found that keen safety management reduces 
incident rates, curtails materials damage, improves working conditions, enhances 
employee motivation, refutes absenteeism, bolsters productivity, stimulates 
innovation, strengthens the organizational image, sustains sales, impacts profits, 
and maintains marketability. 
 A limitation of this study is that the researchers thought it was necessary 
to only obtain information from the organizations Safety Managers. They figured 
this would be the only way to ensure adequate and truthful feedback was 
collected. In this respect, the data could be interpreted as being biased because 
the respondent pool was made up of safety professionals, who in their own right 
will view safety as a linchpin to organizational success. However, it may have 
been worthwhile to collect opinions from other employees in order to add non-
biased points of view. In doing so the data could have painted a more complete 
picture as to what safety management truly influences. 
 Fograscher (1999) spoke about the importance of knowing how to sell 
safety to executives. It was identified that although management commitment is 
vital to OSH program success according to OSHA, NIOSH, and other reputable 
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and governing bodies; none of these entities have described exactly how to 
obtain it. Thus, Fograscher states that when marketing anything, the marketer 
must know their audience. To obtain management commitment, the safety 
professional must speak the executive’s language. For, example, if the executive 
is motivated by numbers then safety information should be presented statistically; 
if the executive is production oriented then safety information should be 
presented in terms of how lost work days negatively impact production capability 
and the profit margin. Fograscher’s research indicated that “Role Clarity” is key to 
ensuring appropriate management commitment, meaning the executive must 
know what is expected of him or her and how to achieve success in order to be 
successful. 
 This article is notable because it introduces Role Clarity as a concept to 
be considered when trying to obtain management commitment. Often times 
safety professionals expect senior leaders to inherently understand their role as it 
relates to OSH. However, if those duties and responsibilities are not fully and 
clearly articulated then failure or lack of support is imminent. 
 Frik (2011) researched OSH Management Systems (MSs) and there 
relation to employee influence. The article explored the fruition of voluntary MSs 
versus regulatory MSs. The article defined voluntary as an organization operating 
under a self-developed or other recognized MSs that meet minimum regulatory 
standards, but provides the latitude of self-monitoring. Conversely, those 
organizations not choosing to adopt a MS are those seemingly managing their 
OSH program, issue to issue, and remain subject to external audits by regulatory 
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bodies. By comparing and contrasting MSs in various European countries to 
include the United States; research indicates voluntary MSs seem to focus more 
on employees reporting less injuries as opposed to working toward abating the 
hazards that lead to injuries. Additionally, these same organizations do not 
receive the benefit of external audits and thus, according to research, tout a good 
OSH program while reality may indicate otherwise. To that end, it was concluded 
that an active OSH MS of any type neither guarantees employee influence or a 
successful OSH program. It did, however, explicate the importance of 
management commitment regardless of whether the MS is voluntary or 
regulatory. Management commitment is the component of an OSH program that 
is universally acknowledged as necessary to OSH program success. 
 Gyekye and Salminen (2007) examined the nexus between positive 
organizational support and organizational safety climate. This study hypothesized 
that the safety climate of an organization, which is a subset of safety culture, will 
be positive or negative based on the employee’s perception of organizational 
support. Through a survey, employee interviews, and workplace observations, 
320 industrial workers participated in the study. Respondents varied in age, 
education level, and length of employment. In addition to the many sub-
categories, the survey questioned worker safety, co-worker safety, supervisor 
safety, management safety, satisfaction with safety programs, and incident 
frequency (self-measured). Overall, results supported the hypothesis that 
employees who perceive the organization as being supportive, attentive, caring, 
and genuine expressed high perspectives toward the organizational safety 
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climate. Contrariwise, those employees who expressed discontent with 
organizational support, articulated dissatisfaction with the organizational safety 
climate. In addition, the study revealed that participation in safety programs 
seemed to be an avenue employee used to reciprocate their appreciation of 
organizational or managerial support. 
 A limitation of this study was that employees were asked to provide 
information on how often they have safety-related incidents as opposed to the 
surveyor gathering actual data from organizational incident records or a 
reputable labor statistics gathering body. 
 Huang, Verma, Chang, Courtney, Lombardi, Brennan, Perry, (2012) 
examined, specific to the restaurant industry, employees perceptions of safety 
training versus management commitment to safety and the association with 
future injuries and whether or not these concepts would be better treated as two 
elements of a singular factor (safety perception) or as two separate factors. 
According to the Bureau of Labor Statics the restaurant industry is ranked third in 
the total count of injuries and illnesses for industries with 100,000 or more non-
fatal cases. Using a Cohort Study model, the researchers surveyed thirty-four 
limited service (fast food) restaurants located in six states. The researches spent 
approximately one working day at each location conducting employee 
observations and surveys. Measured areas included demographic information, 
perceived management commitment to safety, perceived safety training, and 
future injury rates. In addition, respondents were asked to provide incident data 
to the researchers for the twelve weeks following the survey and were paid to do 
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so as an incentive. Respondents provided this information by telephone, internet-
based survey, or by accomplishing written follow-up survey forms. The study 
concluded that employee’s perceptions of management commitment to safety 
and safety training were both significant predictors of future injury outcomes at 
times and not at all during other times. The variation resides with the employees 
understanding of training and their perception of management’s commitment to 
safety. For example, while many employees viewed new-hire orientation as a 
part of their safety training, other employees did not. Consequently, the study 
also revealed that many employees performing the exact same duties, in 
identical environments, and who received like training perceived their training 
differently. These variances confirmed, when compared to observational data, 
that when employees perceive the management as having a high level of 
commitment to safety, then their perception of safety training is equally high; and 
vice versa. Finally, the researchers also concluded that the concepts are better 
off being treated as two separate factors. 
 A limitation of this study is that it did not factor in management’s 
perception of their commitment to safety and safety training. This information 
would have been useful as comparative data to the data retrieved form the 
employees. 
 Kedjidjian (1995) discussed the importance of understanding that the 
philosophy of “do as I say and not as I do” has no place in any safety program 
and will be a hindrance if continually practiced by management. By way of 
referencing successful CEO’s who understand the importance of employee 
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safety and its correlation to profitability and productivity, Kedjidjian solidified the 
notion that if management is not fully and outwardly committed to OSH in the 
work environment then efforts to develop and sustain a safe and healthful work 
environment will be futile. Safety professionals being helpers and advisors to 
management versus having OSH program ownership was also a theme in the 
article. This theme supported the management commitment tenet in that senior-
level management should have a deep enough understanding of their OSH 
program so that when the safety professional (technical advisor) presents 
information, they can comfortably make an informed decision. Kedjidjian 
conveyed that all too often management shy’s away from accepting OSH 
program ownership due to lack of sufficient understanding of basic OSH 
principles. Kedjidjian also discussed how to effectively market safety to 
management to obtain their interest and buy-in. 
 A limitation of this article was Kedjidjian’s discussion on managerial 
accountability. Although it was discussed indirectly, the article seemed to lean 
more toward marketing safety versus how to hold management accountable for 
their safety programs. 
 This article will be useful to this research project because it alluded to the 
nexus between managerial accountability, management commitment, and 
successful OSH programs. The correlation between these three components 
leaves much to be researched, discussed, and fleshed out. OSH has always 
been a supporting program and has hardly ever been deemed mission critical or 
“key.” Many safety professionals like Kedjidjian often touch on accountability, but 
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only usually when referring to supervisors and employees. Since this research 
project will examine aspects of managerial accountability, discussion points this 
article presented will be helpful. 
 Lyon and Hollcroft (2005) examined national and international safety and 
health management systems (SHMS) and its widespread use across various 
organizations. According to their research, of the many notable SHMS’s, 
including OSHA’s VPP, the key factors analogous with all of them is “leadership 
and management commitment are the most critical elements.” They discovered 
that each of the voluntary SHMS emphasizes the importance of continual 
improvement and as such derived a model which promotes the notion of “plan-
do-check-act” or PDCA. In each of the components they cite senior management 
as the linchpin to success. For example, plans cannot be made amongst various 
organizational departments prior to senior management creating an OSH policy, 
which should align with the overall organizational vision. In addition, during the 
“act” (implementation) phase where most would think this is the sole task of front-
line supervisors; Lyon and Hollcroft hinges success on how well management 
communicates their vision, policy, and plan and why it is important to their 
employees. This use of effective communication not only conveys their direction, 
but as the messengers, directly involves them in the program. 
 Marsh (2010) discussed how to deter the workforce away from bad habits 
and temptations to “cut corners.” By applying the ABC model (antecedents, 
behaviors, consequences), it was found that employees lack the will and (or) 
encouragement to ask why. As such, this missing factor has the potential to set 
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in motion a chain of events that influence negative or less desirable employee 
behaviors. Marsh believes management who trains supervisors on what they 
want them to do without taking time to explain why or answer questions, 
effectively limit their employees capabilities and fosters unsafe behavior. By 
taking time with employees to hear their concerns, take action on reasonable 
issues, and have frequent peer-to-peer interaction, management will innately be 
displaying their commitment. Marsh also acknowledges their remain those 
managers who think they are committed to their OSH program although they 
treat safety as a necessary evil that hinders production. 
 This article is relevant to the research project because it subtly portrays 
another side of effective” management commitment. The article indicates that 
management commitment is more than establishing policy, and giving direction. 
It can be management simply making themselves available to their employees, 
ensuring they follow-through and follow-up, and walking their talk. 
 Michael, Evans, Jansen, & Haight (2005) examined the relationship 
between non-safety outcomes amongst employees and management 
commitment. This study readily acknowledged the importance of management 
commitment, but approached their study from the standpoint of whether or not it 
unilaterally influences employee perceptions of safety and associated programs. 
By surveying 641 hourly employees at three wood products manufacturing 
facilities, this study pooled data on subjects such as: perceptions of management 
commitment to safety, perceived job-related dangerousness, organizational 
commitment, and withdrawal behaviors. Results indicated that the social 
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exchange between management and employees is a more predominant factor 
than basic management commitment. When employees felt as though their work 
and they as individuals were valued by their employer, they felt indebted to their 
employer and reciprocated accordingly. This reciprocation was not directly 
derivative of management’s singular commitment to safety, but their overall 
organizational support. As employees perceive they are emphatically being taken 
care of they respond with safer work practices, increased production, and 
reduced absenteeism. This study also recognized that managers are often faced 
with conflicting priorities which ultimately causes them to choose where to focus 
their attention. However, while managers juggle their conflicting priorities, 
employees simply want to feel genuinely valued and in turn will take care of their 
employer the best way they can. Typically, employees will reciprocate in a 
manner that is related to safety since it’s something they have direct control of. 
 O’Toole (2002) examined the value of Safety Culture and its components 
as it relates to safety and health program improvement and incident reduction. 
Several years prior to the survey, company leadership decided to change their 
safety culture from being driven by compliance to being driven by “doing the right 
things.” To accomplish this, they integrated safety into the managers and 
supervisors performance plans and focused on leadership commitment and 
accountability. The study was not only meant to gain a pulse of this new culture 
with goals of proving or disproving the cultural shift, but to also serve as a 
baseline to be used to derive future metrics. The study was conducted using a 
41-item modified Minnesota Perception Survey with question geared toward: 
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management’s commitment to safety, education and knowledge, safety 
supervisor process, employee involvement and commitment, drugs and alcohol, 
emergency response, and off-the-job safety. The study’s subject was a mining 
and construction products company with facilities and employees in eight states. 
A total of 3,116 employee surveys were issued and 1,114 were returned and 
scrutinized. Results indicated a direct connection to employee perceptions and a 
reduction in injury rates resultant of management’s new approach to safety. 
 A limitation of this study is that it did not survey supervisors, managers, 
and senior leaders to gain their perspective of why their cultural shift has had a 
positive effect on the OSH program. It could be assumed that they would merely 
state the obvious in that their shift in attitude resulted in a trickle-down effect 
ultimately changing employee perception. However, having data to confirm or 
deny suspicions would have added value. 
 Smith, Cohen, Cohen and Cleveland (1978) researched characteristics of 
successful safety programs by conducting on-site surveys of seven pairs of 
various manufacturing companies. Program areas rated included: corporate 
organization, management commitment to safety, management efficiency, plant 
solvency, plant physical characteristics, workforce characteristics, union 
characteristics, pay scheme, and safety program characteristics. In addition to 
issuing employee surveys to volunteers, the assessment team spent two-thirds of 
their time conducting employee and staff interviews and observing work 
practices. This observation allowed the researchers to effectively compare and 
contrast the companies. Ratings were averaged from the surveys on a seven-
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point scale (1-very poor to 7-excellent), which generated “high” and “low” incident 
potential rates. The individual ratings were then categorized low or high in each 
measured area depending on the raw number. As additional comparative data 
and justification for their findings, notes from the interviews and observations 
were also considered. Results of the study indicated plants with a low incident 
potential rate had greater management commitment and involvement in plant 
safety matters, greater skills in managing material and human resources, used a 
humanistic approach when dealing with employees, possessed higher levels of 
housekeeping and environmental qualities, had less absenteeism and turnover, 
and did not employ a dedicated safety manager/director. 
 This study will benefit the research project because it confirmed that 
neither processes nor targeted program oversight supersedes “direct and 
personal” management commitment. This study revealed that, on average, those 
companies with structured safety programs (collateral duty safety officers, 
awards and recognition programs, safety committees, etc) were not as 
successful as those companies whose senior leaders simply took a personal 
interest in the safety and health of their employees. This study proved that 
management meaningfully interacting with employees directly contributes to a 
successful safety program. 
 Trebswether (2003) examined the United Parcel Service’s (UPS) 
Comprehensive Health, and Safety Process (CHSP) to determine the root of their 
OSH success.  Through employee and leadership interviews and work practice 
observations, Trebswether found that UPS largely contributes its success to its 
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workforce. Although UPS cites management commitment as a pivotal component 
to the overall process; UPS likes to think of its managers and senior leaders as 
the support system to the employees safety program. Within leadership approved 
parameters and by way of the CHSP, employees are given complete autonomy 
with respect to administering the OSH program. Managers and senior leaders 
stay involved by making themselves available to hear employee concerns and 
making it a point to correct unsafe and/or unhealthful working conditions. This 
method has built a trust between management and the workforce and has proven 
successful in that between 1996 and 2001, UPS reduced its lost workday 
injury/illness frequency by 49 percent and helped reduce automotive incident 
frequencies by 16 percent. Management’s motto is “safety is just another slogan 
if it doesn’t come from the top and if it doesn’t have some teeth.” 
 Walker and Maune (2000) examined the implementation of a “step-
change” safety program for a multi-million dollar construction project in the 
Middle East. At the onset of the project, Chevron, the parent company, wanted to 
ensure their model of “protecting people and the environment” echoed overseas 
among their foreign subsidiaries and that their typical mindset of ignoring safety 
was negated. Thus, they contracted a safety consultation firm who developed 
and implemented a safety model that expounded upon Chevron’s core model 
and encompassed some foundational principles of occupational safety and 
health. Of the three tier model, the first tier directly involved executive leadership 
and held them accountable for various aspects of the model such as visible 
commitment, funding, and genuine support. Tiers two and three included all other 
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necessary OSH programmatics spanning from audits and incentive programs to 
training, safety committees, and employee accountability. After 28.5 months 
(design and construction), the project was completed below budget and with an 
exemplary safety record. In more than 13 million construction hours worked, the 
company only experienced one lost-time injury and two recordable injuries. The 
model revealed that no factor weighed heavier in their success than 
management commitment. 
 A limitation of the model is that the consultant firm based success on 
rates. Although numbers are excellent for comparative data, conducting a climate 
survey amongst the workforce once the project was complete may have provided 
a clearer picture and perhaps revealed an anomaly that also contributed to the 
outcome, but was not considered at the onset of model implementation. 
 The significance of this study is that it indicates the pillars of successful 
safety and health programs are not only effective in the United States, but hold 
true across cultures and national borders. Though the consultant firm 
approached Chevron with a pre-determined model in mind, they made certain to 
account for cultural differences, which ensured effective implementation of their 
processes. This approach also shed light on the importance of leadership taking 
the necessary time to understand their workforce. 
 
Conclusions 
The Literature Review identified studies and peer-reviewed articles that 
overwhelmingly supported the theory that whether an organization is within the 
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confines of the United States or abroad, and regardless of the industry or 
organizational structure; management commitment is the most important 
component when developing, implementing, and sustaining a successful 
occupational safety and health program. All studies and articles supported this 
notion through employee surveys, interviews, and workplace observations. 
However, a predominant issue yet to be explored is the proverbial question 
“where are senior leaders deficient with regard to committing to their OSH 
programs.” 
This Literature Review effectively underscores why management 
commitment is necessary as well as provides feasible models on how to achieve 
it, but lacks content or theory on why it continues to be cited as the “weakest link” 
within OSH management systems and (or) programs. Moreover, due to the lack 
of relative information, this Literature Review does not provide any information on 
management commitment as it relates to Federal Agency Programs. 
Consequently, this research project aims to extend previous research by 
identifying and investigating the reason(s) Federal Agency Program leaders 
struggle to commit to their OSH programs. Though, a typical methodology will be 
used to glean information, the difference will be based on who the information is 
obtained from; senior leaders. By surveying senior leaders, top management 
officials, executives, managers, etc and asking them very pointed questions; this 
research project will attempt to unravel this issue and offer recommendations for 
corrective action. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
 
Context of the Study 
 This study was designed to identify areas of Federal Agency OSH 
programs which are ignored by senior leaders and ultimately inhibits them from 
fully committing to their OSH programs. The anonymous, web-based survey 
provided respondents the opportunity to answer question freely without fear of 
reprisal. It also gave the researcher an understanding of why certain elements of 
an OSH program are indeed overlooked. 
 To ensure survey validity, questions were strictly based off 29 CFR 1960, 
Basic Program Elements for Federal Employees. This regulation requires that all 
federal agencies conduct self-evaluations on a recurring basis to “determine the 
effectiveness of their occupational safety and health programs. The self-
evaluations are to include qualitative assessments of the extent to which their 
agency safety and health programs are: (a) developed in accordance with the 
requirements set forth in Executive Order 12196 and part 1960 and, (b) 
Implemented effectively in all agency field activities (OSHA, 1980).” All questions 
are directly related to specific program areas discussed in the regulation and 
were thus deemed appropriate and necessary for overall compliance. By design, 
the survey provided a since of familiarity to respondents since they are asked 
comparable questions on a recurring basis from their servicing safety staff. 
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Selection of Participants 
 The sample group consisted of senior leaders from the Transportation 
Security Administration and Dobbins Air Reserve Base. 
Transportation Security Administration Background 
 Following September 11, 2001, the Transportation Security Administration 
was created to strengthen the security of the nation’s transportation systems and 
ensure the freedom of movement for people and commerce. TSA secures the 
nation’s airports and screens all commercial airline passengers and baggage.  
Dobbins Air Reserve Base Background 
 The mission of Dobbins Air Reserve Base is to provide highly trained 
Citizen Airmen who execute versatile and reliable C-130 aircraft operations. To 
accomplish this, it recruits, organizes and trains Air Force Reservists for active 
duty in time of war, national emergency, or contingency tasking. 
 A pre-requisite for study participation included organizational position. This 
involved possessing the title, position, and associated responsibilities of 
“Commander” at Dobbins and “Federal Security Director” at the TSA, both of 
which are senior leader or executive level positions which encompass 
supervision of 100 or more employees. No other criteria was consider.   
 The researcher chose participants from the TSA and Dobbins because he 
is employed with both organizations as an Occupational Safety and Health 
Manager, has intricate knowledge of operations, and is professionally acquainted 
with many participants in the sample group. Having knowledge and 
understanding of selected organizations enabled the researcher to examine data 
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and compare that information to what typically occurs based on daily 
observations and interactions. 
 
Research Questions 
 In what areas of 29 CFR 1960 are Federal Agency Program leaders 
deficient with regard to committing to their OSH programs? This study sought to 
answer this question by issuing a twenty-three question survey based on OSHA 
prescribed essential program elements to a group of federal agency program 
leaders. 
 
Data Collection 
The research design was based solely on the survey and its proper 
distribution to respondents, and analysis of data received. The survey was 
composed of “structured questions” that were designed to garner fixed responses 
i.e.: strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, and strongly disagree. Questions 
were worded in a way that induced respondents to answer only in terms of the 
five aforementioned options. The survey was comprehensive and provided a 
structured question for each point OSHA deems essential to senior leader 
commitment. 
The survey remained accessible to participants for 30 calendar days. This 
timeframe was chosen to ensure maximum participation since those in the 
sample group are typically inundated with mission responsibilities. 
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 The survey was created using Adobe Forms Central, copyright © 2011-
2013 Adobe Systems Incorporated and its licensors. All Rights Reserved. The 
program allowed the researcher to develop the survey, provided a dedicated 
website for participants to access the survey, and gathered necessary 
information, which enabled the researcher to analyze data retrieved. 
 
Data Analysis 
 In accordance with 29 CFR 1960, Basic Program Elements for Federal 
Employees and responsibilities it charges to senior leaders, every survey 
question should have been responded to with “strongly agree” or “agree.” The 
method used to analyze data retrieved from the survey was to identify those 
questions that garnered 30% or greater response from respondents with 
“neutral,” “disagree,” or “strongly disagree” and note them as “common themes.” 
Upon identification they were extrapolated for further assessment. To that end, of 
the twenty-three survey questions, five were recognized as common themes. 
 
Subjectivities or Bias 
 To ensure bias was omitted from the study, the researcher derived survey 
questions from 29 CFR Part 1960, Basic Program Elements for Federal 
Employees and did not add to or take from the intent of the regulation. This 
method made certain questions were fair, relative, and appropriate for all 
respondents. Since the researcher is employed by both agencies, the study was 
conducted separate from day-to-day activities and labeled as a special project for 
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the purpose gaining an understanding of how Senior Leaders manage their 
Occupational Safety and Health programs. There were no incentives offered to 
respondents for their participation. 
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Chapter 4 
Research Findings and Analysis 
 
Findings and Analysis 
 The survey used in this study was comprised of twenty-three questions. 
Five of the twenty-three were identified as “common themes” or contributing 
factors to the issue at hand; in what areas of 29 CFR 1960 are Federal Agency 
Program leaders deficient with regard to committing to their OSH programs. 
Listed below, in no order of relevance, are the five “common themes” with the 
percent of respondents, the OSHA requirement or guideline, and a textual 
analysis. 
1. (50%) I ensure all employees are evaluated on their OSH performance. 
o “Each agency head shall ensure that any performance evaluation of 
any management official in charge of an establishment, any 
supervisory employee, or other appropriate management official, 
measures that employee's performance in meeting requirements of the 
agency occupational safety and health program, consistent with the 
employee's assigned responsibilities and authority, and taking into 
consideration any applicable regulations of the Office of Personnel 
Management or other appropriate authority. (OSHA, 1980).” 
 Evaluating an employee’s OSH performance is the basis for establishing a 
system of accountability amongst the workforce. A primary concern for many 
employees is to ensure that, at a minimum, they meet standards developed by 
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their employer. It is not uncommon for employees to hold non-performance items 
to a lesser degree of consideration while focusing on those items their employer 
deem important. This practice fosters an environment of non-compliance coupled 
with a lack of understanding and respect for safety. 
 In order to hold employees accountable for their safety and the safety of 
others, it is incumbent on management to ensure employees are aware of and 
understand the organizational policy. Understanding does not germinate and 
propagate within the workforce by management stating OSH is important, then 
contradicting themselves by not rating employees on OSH performance.  
Establishing appropriate OSH evaluation criteria solidifies the organizational 
policy, echoes managements position, reinforces employee responsibility, and 
bolsters a Culture of Safety. 
2. (45%) I ensure adequate financial resources are budgeted for OSH program 
administration. 
o “The Designated Agency Safety and Health Official, management 
officials in charge of each establishment, safety and health officials 
at all appropriate levels, and other management officials shall be 
responsible for planning, requesting resources, implementing, and 
evaluating the occupational safety and health program budget in 
accordance with the regulations of the Office of Management and 
Budget Circular A-11 (sections 13.2(f) and 13.5(f)) and other 
relevant documents (OSHA, 1980).” 
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 Administration of an OSH program requires funding and resource 
allocation to exist or thrive. A typical OSH program will require funds and 
resources for hazard abatement, special assessments, equipment maintenance, 
facility upkeep, program promotion, awards and recognition, multi-media, etc. 
When leadership considers what the annual budget for the organization should 
be, OSH must be considered. Failure to budget for OSH is detrimental to a 
thriving program and stifling to the onset of a one. Leaderships willingness to 
budget appropriately for the administration of their OSH program is indicative of 
their commitment  
3. (30%) I attend safety meetings. 
o “Committees shall have equal representation of management and non-
management employees, who shall be members of record (OSHA, 
1980)”. 
 To foster a Culture of Safety and demonstrate commitment, management 
should participate in OSH safety meetings. This will allow them to respond to 
safety issues and concerns and develop solutions to aid in the implementation of 
their OSH program. Similarly, employees should work closely with and under the 
direction of management in support of the OSH program and suggest initiatives 
to promote general safety awareness in the workplace. In this forum employees 
are afforded the opportunity to voice their concerns and obtain immediate and 
direct feedback from the individuals charged with ensuring their workplace is safe 
and healthful. Collaboration to this extent bolsters a trusting work relationship 
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between management and the workforce and establishes a layer of 
accountability for both sides. 
4. (40%) I issue an annual OSH Policy Letter that enforce local OSH policy and 
goals; and set expectations for a culture of safety. 
o “Management Commitment. (i) State clearly a worksite policy on safe 
and healthful work and working conditions, so that all personnel with 
responsibility at the site and personnel at other locations with 
responsibility for the site understand the priority of safety and health 
protection in relation to other organizational values. (ii) Establish and 
communicate a clear goal for the safety and health program and 
objectives for meeting that goal, so that all members of the 
organization understand the results desired and the measures planned 
for achieving them (Foster, 1989).” 
 The issuance of an annual OSH Policy Letter is an extremely useful tool 
leadership can utilize to communicate their personal commitment to their 
establishment’s OSH program. By taking time to establish goals, crafting a road 
map for achieving those goals, and agreeing to a level of self-accountability is 
necessary. The “commitment letter” or OSH Policy Letter is a critical step toward 
establishing or maintaining an OSH program. 
 To maintain the integrity and usefulness of the letter, it is crucial that 
leadership agree to terms that are reasonable and S.M.A.R.T. The letter should 
not be viewed as “just another requirement,” but rather an opportunity to 
communicate to the workforce and provide a transparent mode of operating with 
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regard to OSH. Appropriate use of this mechanism will refute incredulity amongst 
the workforce and provide employees something tangible they can refer to 
indicating not only goals, but expectations as well. 
5. (50%) When I conduct Town Hall Meetings, Commanders Calls, etc; 
Occupational Safety and Health is always an agenda item. 
o “Provide visible top management involvement in implementing the 
program, so that all will understand that management's commitments is 
serious (OSHA, 1980).” 
 Amongst other vital components that add to an effective OSH program, 
leadership visibility may be the linchpin that determines its success or demise. 
The crux of Manage Commitment is leading by example. This includes such 
actions as donning personal protective equipment when in the workplace, 
accomplishing required safety training, holding employees accountable, and 
making time to discuss OSH in the same breath with operational performance, 
efficacy, and solvency. 
 Within federal agencies, occupational safety and health is not typically 
viewed as an expenditure such as equipment and manpower that can be 
managed. Although, there is a definite relationship between OSH performance 
and overall organizational success; this relationship is not always seen as an 
immediate concern. Therefore, OSH is not given a high enough priority that 
warrants time and focus of leadership. Instead OSH is usually managed with the 
“Fireman’s approach.” For example, Fireman fight fires as they arise with vigor 
commensurate to the size and type of fire. 
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 It must be realized by leadership that the Fireman’s approach to managing 
OSH is ineffective. OSH programs require constant maintenance and 
surveillance and a notable way for leadership to exercise their commitment and 
address current and continual issues is through Town Hall type meetings. It is 
important that the workforce hear from their leaders that he or she is aware of 
their concerns and is taking necessary steps to rectify them. 
 In summary, it can reasonably by concluded that “time, understanding, 
and motivation” are undertones among the common themes that suggest cause 
for why FAP leaders are deficient with regard to committing to certain areas of 
their OSH programs. Each of five themes noted require a degree of 
understanding what is required, time to appropriately execute, and motivation to 
ensure follow-through.  
 Unlike the private sector where motivation may drive understanding and 
time due to the threat of penalties and a tarnished organizational safety record 
which may adversely impact future earnings; Federal Agencies do not have that 
same motivation. Federal Agencies are anomalies woven into regulatory 
standards with the expectation that they will comply, but also with the 
understanding that if they do not it is somewhat acceptable. 
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Chapter 5 
Discussions and Implications 
 
 Full management commitment to an organizations Occupational Safety 
and Health program communicates the message that safety is valued as a 
primary priority, even at the expense of productivity, and ensures that personnel 
are not reprimanded for erring on the side of safety. In order for Senior Leaders 
to successfully transmit their commitment to safety in the workplace, the following 
components are necessary: 
Visibility and Participation 
 Provide positive feedback for employees and supervisors using safe work 
practices during walk-around management. 
 
 Take time to support safety activities (walk the talk). 
 
 Ask supervisors about incident investigations, causal and contributing 
factors, and the status of corrective actions. 
 
 Participate in Safety Committee meetings and encourage progress on 
action items. 
 
 Include safety as an agenda item at regular meetings at all levels. 
 
 Participate in occasional informal inspections. 
 
 
Acknowledging Consequences of Non-Action  
The reactive approach results in increased economic and social costs of 
incidents. Recognize that ignoring or delaying safety program activities and 
corrective actions has negative effects, including:  
 Increased vulnerability to the mission. 
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 Worsening system deficiencies, deteriorating working conditions, and 
increased safety hazards.  
 
 Lower employee morale.  
 
 
Engaging the Workforce  
Encourage a questioning attitude toward workplace operations and conditions. 
 Seek employee participation in developing and implementing solutions.  
 
 
Implementing Best Practices  
Discuss safety as the first item on the upper level meeting agenda. Possible 
topics to include are: 
 Current incidents and related causes.  
 
 Status of corrective actions from prior incidents.  
 
 Focus on prevention activities.  
 
 
Create an Incident Review Board, the purpose of which is to 
 Demonstrate management commitment and interest in a safe and 
healthful work environment for all employees.  
 
 Discuss the circumstances of the incident with the involved employees 
and witnesses (if applicable).  
 
 Evaluate the incident investigation report and related information to 
determine if causal and contributing factors and recommendations for 
corrective action are accurate.  
 
 Eliminate or, at a minimum, reduce future occurrence of incident. 
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Become a Safety Champion 
Safety Champions are anyone and everyone at the work locations embraces 
OSH. When promoting a Culture of Safety, Senior Leaders must stress upon 
everyone that they are a Safety Champion in the organization as they: 
 Perform job duties in a professional, safe manner every day, every time; 
and offer and accept advice on improving work processes.  
 
 Provide enthusiastic support and participation for safety events.  
 
 Learn about and educate other employees about local safety goals, 
events, and systems.  
 
 Assist the Safety Committee, when requested, to create strategies and 
processes that promote local safety initiatives. 
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Occupational Safety and Health Program Survey Questions and Data 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
01. I ensure that the OSH Policy Statement 
signed by the Senior Agency Official 
(Installation Commander, Administrator, etc) is 
displayed in prominent locations within work 
areas. 
 
0% 0% 5%  35%  60%
02. I ensure guidance on OSH Protection for employees is 
thorough and posted in prominent locations throughout 
employee work areas. 
 
0% 0% 10%  40%  50%
03. I issue an Annual OSH Policy Letter that enforces local 
OSH policy and goals; and sets expectations for a Culture 
of Safety. 
 
15% 10% 15%  35%  25%
04. My managers, supervisors, and employees are made 
aware of agency and local OSH policy, goals, and 
expectations. 
 
0% 0% 5%  50%  45%
05. I encourage employees to identify safety and health 
hazards, correct them when appropriate and/or submit an 
Unsafe or Unhealthful Working Conditions Report. 
0% 0% 0%  20%  80%
06. I ensure OSH policy, goals, and expectations are 
communicated to all employees 
 
0% 0% 5%  40%  55%
07. I actively participate in the OSH program. 0% 0% 10%  30%  60%
07a. I personally demonstrate safe work practices and 
behaviors.  
0% 0% 10%  30%  60%
07b. I attend safety meetings.  0% 20% 10%  30%  40%
07c. When I conduct Town Hall Meetings, Commanders 
Call, etc; Occupational Safety and Health is "always" an 
agenda item.. 
5% 15% 30%  35%  15%
08. I ensure managers, supervisors, and employees 
support local OSH goals and objectives. 
0% 5% 5%  35%  55%
09. I expect managers and supervisors to intervene in the 
safety behavior of others. 
 
0% 0% 0%  15%  85%
10. I ensure all employees are evaluated on their OSH 
performance. 
 
0% 10% 40%  35%  15%
11. I ensure OSH program tasks are specifically assigned 
and clearly communicated. 
 
0% 0% 15%  35%  50%
12. I expect managers and supervisors to investigate 
incidents, accidents, mishaps, etc and enforce OSH 
standards, rules, and regulations in the workplace. 
 
0% 0% 5%  10%  85%
13. I hold all employees accountable for their OSH 
performance. 
 
0% 0% 5%  35%  60%
14. I ensure there is OSH staff to administer the program. 0% 0% 15%  20%  65%
15. I ensure Collateral Duty Safety Officers, Unit Safety 
Representatives, etc have the necessary knowledge, 
skills, and information to perform their duties. 
 
0% 0% 10%  25%  65%
16. I expect individuals to be recognized by their 
immediate supervision for their contributions to the OSH 
program. 
 
0% 0% 10%  30%  60%
17. I personally recognize individuals for their contributions 
to the OSH program 
 
0% 0% 10%  30%  60%
18. I ensure adequate financial resources are budgeted for 
OSH program administration. 
 
0% 5% 40%  30%  25%
19. I rely on my Collateral Duty Safety Officers, Unit Safety 
Representatives, etc to administer the OSH program. 
 
0% 0% 5%  20%  75%
20. I personally ensure the OSH program is maintained in 
accordance with federal, agency, and local policy and 
guidance. 
 
0% 5% 10%  25%  60%
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